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The Electronic Passport and the Future of Government-Issued
RFID-Based Identification
G. Matthew Ezovski, Student Member, IEEE, and Steve E. Watkins, Senior Member, IEEE
this country that homeland security and immigration
officials be confident that they know who is entering and
exiting the country. Current passports contain biographical
information, photographs, and anti-counterfeiting features
like words in invisible ink that are only visible under
ultraviolet light.
To help answer this important question, the U.S. Congress
began requiring that all countries participating in the Visa
Waiver Program, issue a technologically-enhanced passport
based on international standards, including contactless smart
chips. This new travel document contains electronically
stored personal information, along with a digital photograph
of the person to whom the passport was issued. The digital
picture allows immigration officers to perform biometric
comparisons of the individual requesting entry into the
United States with the stored picture to determine if the
person is the rightful owner of the passport. The U.S.
required that all member countries of the VWP began
issuing electronic passports by October 2006. The State
Department also began issuing small numbers of electronic
passports to U.S. diplomats and associated personnel in
early 2006, and public issuance has gradually increased
beginning in August 2006. International standards are
included in the International Civil Aviation Organization
Document 9303.
This work examines the role of contactless integrated
circuit (IC) technology, commonly referred to as RFID, and
other technologies for existing and potential impact on
electronic passports. Various efforts are underway to
modernize many U.S. identity documents, both political and
technical.. Policy discussion includes privacy concerns and
the selection of secure technologies. In particular, we
discuss how RFID technologies have advantages and
disadvantages for electronic passports and other
identification documents.

Abstract — Passports and other identification documents
may be enhanced using recent advancements in technology.
Various national and international bodies are pursuing
machine-readable approaches with biometric information. In
particular, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) has adopted standards whereby passports can store
biometric identifiers. Countries that participate in the Visa
Waiver Program (VWP) began issuing electronic passports in
2006.
However, the selection of technologies remains
questionable due to privacy and security concerns. This paper
examines policy regarding these electronic approaches and
developments toward electronic data storage and transmission.
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) devices for electronic
passports and other existing identity documents are discussed.
Keywords — Electronic Passport, Biometrics, RFID.

T

I. INTRODUCTION

ravel among countries and security concerns are
driving efforts to improve the identification and
passport documents. The international community is
debating policy and technologies regarding electronic
approaches such as radio-frequency identification (RFID)
devices. To facilitate travel, the twenty-seven member
nations participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
require standardized passport documents [1] based on
standards determined by the International Civil Aviation
organization (ICAO). The threat of terrorism increases the
need for positive identification and anti-counterfeiting. The
challenge facing immigration officials today is simple: How
do they know that the person carrying the passport is
actually the rightful owner of the passport? A 2” X 2”
photograph of the owner only provides so many clues as to
the answer to this question and photographic means have
security limitations. Considering that all of the 9/11
hijackers immigrated or traveled to the U.S. from other
countries, it is of the utmost importance to the security of

II. ELECTRONIC IDENTITY DOCUMENTS
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A. Overview of U.S. Passport and VWP Program
The most commonly used method of establishing identity
and citizenship for use in international travel is the passport.
Of the numerous passports in the world, a United States
passport is often considered the “holy grail” of travel
documents, widely respected and accepted by virtually all
nations. In 2004 nearly nine million U.S. passports were
issued [2]. The U.S. Department of State, in conjunction
15

with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), began
issuing a redesigned passport with incorporated technology
to defend against misuse and fraudulent reproduction in
limited numbers to U.S. citizens on August 14, 2006.
Nations also often require certain visitors to apply for a
visa or official authorization from the government in order
to enter. Several western European nations, some south
Pacific nations, Japan, and the United States participate in
the Visa Waiver Program, which allows travelers from any
member country to travel to another member country for up
to 90 days without obtaining a visa. Established in 1986, the
program aims to improve international travel by “promoting
better relations with U.S. allies, eliminating unnecessary
barriers to travel, stimulating the tourism industry, and
permitting the Department of State to focus consular
resources in other areas” [1]. VWP countries generally
follow the guidance of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), an arm of the United Nations, with
respect to passport design and often take part in the body’s
decision-making process [3].

TABLE I
IMPLEMENTED STATE LICENSE TECHNOLOGIES
Technology
Magnetic Stripe
1-D Barcode
2-D Barcode
None

Number of State
Implementations
21
21
45
1

Summary of technologies used to validate and verify
driver’s licenses in all 50 states. Some states use more than
one technology [7].

applies to all military and civilian personnel. Approved in
2001, the Common Access Card (CAC) is now the main
form of identification used by Defense employees, serving
as the primary indicator of authority to enter U.S. military
bases and allowing authorized users to access classified and
unclassified computer resources. All CAC’s contain a
contact IC smart chip, as compared to the contactless RFID,
which stores credentials and authentication information [5].
The contact chip requires the user to remove the card and
slide it into a reader in order to access the digitally signed
and encrypted stored personal information. The CAC also
features one-dimensional and two-dimensional barcodes for
quicker access to basic, unprotected information.
On the other hand, the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Treasury Department are known to
use RFID technology for internal access control purposes
[6].

B. Political Timeline for Biometric/Electronic Passports
The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. pushed national security to
the forefront of American politics. As the U.S. began its
invasion of Afghanistan and assault on the ruling Taliban
regime, Congress and the executive branch searched for
holes in the nation’s intelligence and security infrastructure.
Simultaneously with its pursuit of the Patriot Act, the federal
government sought both policy and technology-based
solutions to the porous border issue. The Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 set, among
numerous other items, “technology standard and
interoperability requirements respecting development and
implementation of the integrated entry and exit data system
and related tamper-resistant, machine-readable documents
containing biometric identifiers” (including October 26,
2004 implementation deadlines) [4]. Sponsored by Rep.
James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisc.), House Judiciary
Committee chairman, the legislation called for total
compliance with ICAO standards for electronic/biometric
passports by VWP countries. The law did not specify which
revision of the standards needed to be complied with,
leading to some recent confusion over what requirements
VWP countries needed to meet.

D. State-Issued Driver’s Licenses and Real ID
The most common form of identification used in the
United States is the state-issued driver’s license. Each state
has its own design, with most currently in circulation having
some embedded technology for the purpose of verification
or guarding against counterfeit documents.
Informal
agreements exist for standardization of these identity
documents, but no overarching standard currently exists.
Table I indicates the current deployment of widely used
driver’s license technologies by specific technology.
An upcoming potential technology deployment which has
garnered substantial attention from politicians and privacy
advocates is the implementation of the Real ID Act of 2005.
Passed in May 2005 as part of an emergency supplemental
appropriations bill for the ongoing war in Iraq, the law calls
for interoperability of state driver’s license databases, along
with a “common machine-readable technology” for all
driver’s licenses issued nationwide [8]. Nothing in the law
dictates what that technology will be, what it will store, or if
it can be used to store biometric data. The Department of
Homeland Security is charged with determining the
standards for these newly revised licenses, and the law
specifies 2008 as the year when the DHS-specified standards
will go into effect.

C. Other Federal Government Identity Documents
Numerous recent deployments of technology-based
identity documents have taken place under the auspices of
government agencies other than the State Department, and
more are likely to occur in the near future. In fact, the lack
of a government-wide standard for identity documents has
been greatly criticized.
Perhaps the most notable recent deployment of identity
documents was initiated by the Department of Defense and
16

Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD)
began investigating “the compatibility of currently available
biometric technologies with the issuance and inspection
processes relevant to MRTDs.” [11] According to the
Biometric Consortium, “Biometrics are automated methods
of recognizing a person based on a physiological or
behavioral characteristic.” [12] Many of the earliest uses of
primitive biometrics technology focused on identification of
criminals. In 1903 the New York state prison system began
using fingerprints to identify criminals, and in 1921
Congress established the Identification Division of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation [13].
The ICAO’s New Technologies Working Group (NTWG)
looked to biometric comparisons as a more conclusive
means of authenticating documents, both through comparing
printed data to electronic data and comparing stored
biometric data against samples from the individual
attempting to use the passport. The overriding concern was
confirming that the holder of the passport was actually the
rightful owner of the document. In February 2002, the
NTWG endorsed facial feature, fingerprint, and iris
recognition technologies as applicable to machine-readable
travel documents (MRTDs). Subsequently, in Berlin in June
2002, the NTWG endorsed the “use of face recognition as
the globally interoperable biometric for machine assisted
identity confirmation with machine readable travel
documents,” leaving iris and fingerprint technologies as
optional additions [14].

Fig. 1. An Australian passport data page with visible machine
readable zone (MRZ) on the lower portion [9]

III. ELECTRONIC PASSPORT ICAO STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT
A. Changes to Passport Design
The first major requirement instituted by the ICAO and
subsequently by the United States was the inclusion of a
machine-readable zone (MRZ) on the passport. Through the
use of optical character recognition hardware and software,
a computer can read and capture the data printed in the
MRZ, eliminating the need for an immigration or customs
officer to manually enter and confirm a portion of the data
contained on the passport. The MRZ is the lower two lines
of text on the document in Fig. 1.
Beginning on June 26, 2005, all VWP travelers entering
the United States were required to possess a passport with an
MRZ [10]. The use of standard placement and data
formatting, as established by the ICAO, has allowed for
relatively uniform dispersion of this technology.
While inclusion of the MRZ sped up passport processing,
it did little to improve the document’s inherent security. The
practice of removing a passport holder’s picture and
replacing it with another, however, has garnered much
attention as a potentially simple means of committing
passport fraud. To guard against this security flaw, the U.S.
has required that passports from VWP countries all contain
what the State Department calls a “digital photograph” on
the data page. While there is nothing digital about the
printed picture itself, the fact that it is printed directly onto
the data page, rather than being subsequently attached,
guards against fraud. U.S. passports have contained these
digital photographs for several years, and under new
Department of Homeland Security guidelines, all VWP
countries were required to produce similarly protected
passports by October 26, 2005, in order for their passports to
continue to be accepted at American points of entry.

C. Data Storage Technologies
One of the greatest challenges facing the ICAO was the
selection of a technology for storing biometric and other
data onboard the passport.
The generally accepted
technologies included two-dimensional bar codes, contact
integrated circuit (IC) chips, contactless IC chips, and
optical memory. Each technology has its advantages and
drawbacks. Several guidelines were used in determining a
standard [15].
•
•
•
•
•

Non-proprietary technology was required.
“Document integrity” needed to be maintained.
Stored data needed to be easily accessible.
Quick transmission times were preferred.
Memory needed to support in excess of 20 KB of
storage on one chip or equivalent.

Two-dimensional bar code technology did not meet the
image file storage space requirement, and was eliminated
from consideration on most other counts as well.
Contactless IC chips showed shorter transmission times than
contact chips and also assisted the ICAO’s goal of making it
easy to access the stored data, since they can be
electronically read in any orientation as long as they are

B. The Move to Biometric Technologies
Beginning in 1980 the ICAO looked to emerging
technologies to enhance the security of passports and
identity documents, and in 1999 its Technical Advisory
17

Standardization (ISO) standards set a maximum of 10 cm on
the distance from which the data can be read, but this limit is
likely to have little effect in practice, as explained later in
this section [15].
Groups including the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and Privacy International have questioned the use
of contactless chips instead of comparable contact-based
chips. They feared a combination of identity theft and
surveillance, both of which they believe could have been
avoided through the use of other data storage technologies.
At that time Privacy International indicated that it was
“increasingly concerned that the biometric travel document
initiative is part and parcel of a larger surveillance
infrastructure monitoring the movement of individuals
globally that includes Passenger-Name Record transfers,
API systems and the creation of an intergovernmental
network of interoperable electronic data systems to facilitate
access to each country's law enforcement and intelligence
information” [18].
Passive RFID chips, instead of requiring batteries for
power, are powered by the magnetic field emitted from the
reader. The passport does not broadcast its own signal;
rather, it reflects a modified version of the signal sent by the
reader in order to communicate.
The distance from which the chip can be read is a
function of the power of the field generated by the reader, in
conjunction with the physical parameters of the RFID chip.
It is not a limit that can be completely set through
modifications to the chip itself. Studies have shown that the
data on some of the early prototype electronic passports can
be read using specialized readers from over 30 feet away.
The equipment necessary to achieve this, however, cannot at
this time be carried or operated discretely [19]. Generally, an
increase in the power of the reader can increase the distance
from which the chip can be read without the chip knowing
the difference.
FCC standards prohibit signals from
exceeding certain power levels (generally due to health
concerns, e.g., cell phones), and often prohibit the
production of devices which could deviate from the standard
[20]. There is no assurance, however, that an individual or
organization trying to gain unauthorized access to another’s
passport would choose to operate within such boundaries.

within range of the chip reader. As a result, the ICAO stated
in its March 21, 2003 New Orleans Resolution,
Member States, in their initial deployment of MRTDs
with biometrics identifiers, are encouraged to adopt
Contactless IC media of sufficient capacity to facilitate
on-board storage of additional MRTD data and
biometric identifiers [15].
According to the main ICAO technical specification for
biometric passports, Document 9303, all of the data
currently printed on the data page of the passport must be
stored on the IC chip. This includes the photograph, which
will be used for biometric comparisons. The Logical Data
Structure, specified in Document 9303, provides a
comprehensive architecture for storing this information,
along with additional optional information an individual
country might choose to include either for added security or
to allow the document to serve purposes other than those
normally attributed to the passport [16].
The ICAO has included digital signature protection based
on the public key infrastructure (PKI) to help authorities
confirm that the data stored on a passport’s RFID chip had
not been modified. A digital signature is a hash table
created using a publicly available key. This table can be
compared with the stored data to determine if it has been
modified. A skilled computer scientist, given access to the
key used to assemble the hash table, could modify the
signature to show that the stored data is accurate even if it is
not [17].
D. Required Implementation Schedule
The deadlines for U.S. implementation of biometric
passports, as well as implementation by other VWP
countries, were delayed several times, with the final
American deadline being October 26, 2006, for facial
images stored on a contactless IC chip. DHS policy at that
time indicated that the United States would stop accepting
passports under the Visa Waiver Program from individuals
who were citizens of countries which had not begun issuing
electronic passports by that date [10].
IV. SECURITY OBSTACLES

B. Basic Access Control
Basic access control (BAC) causes the RFID chip itself to
prevent access by unauthorized readers. In order for a
reader to access an electronic passport with basic access
control, it would have to already know the individual key for
that particular chip. ICAO standards for basic access control
focus on using a piece of passport-holder data from the
printed data page’s MRZ as the key for accessing the chip.
An incorrect key would result in a denial of access. The
standards specify a combination of the individual passport

A. Skimming
Among the greatest concerns of security and privacy
watchdog groups is the idea that an unscrupulous individual
could “skim,” or secretly steal from a distance, the data
stored on an electronic passport or other identity document's
RFID chip. While it is unclear what purpose this might
serve, Americans have learned through the rise in identity
theft that they must keep personal information as close as
possible.
ICAO and International Organization for
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V. EFFICACY OF PASSPORT REVISIONS

number and personal information as the key [21].
ICAO standards do not currently require basic access
control, but rather recommend it along with other privacy
and security enhancements. The U.S. State Department,
after substantial public input and outcry over an initial
decision to not use BAC, opted to implement it on American
passports to protect against unauthorized access.

A. Biometric Issues
Questions remain regarding the usefulness of the
electronic passport as currently implemented in the United
States, though many questions regarding privacy and
security have been addressed to the satisfaction of outside
interest groups. Transmission and chip speed has proven to
be a substantial issue. Also, many have questioned the
decision by the State Department to focus solely on facial
recognition as a biometric feature of the passport [23].
The ICAO’s decision to choose facial recognition as the
universal biometric for authenticating passports has also
drawn fire from a number of directions. In terms of the
scientific community, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) noted in 2002 the technological
superiority of ten-finger fingerprint recognition over most
biometrics, including facial recognition [24].
This
superiority is shown in Table II,
Congress has also questioned the ICAO’s selection of
facial recognition, with Congressman Christopher Cox (RCal.), past chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee, insisting that a photograph is not a biometric.
According to him, fingerprints are a more effective
technology. “We should move in the direction of that
biometric that is most likely to keep us safe,” he indicated
during a hearing in early July 2005 [24].
Despite some Congressional disagreement, the State
Department continues to insist that Americans would not
support a fingerprint-based travel document, given the
popular association of fingerprints with criminal activity.
Fingerprints are also a cornerstone of the US-VISIT
program, though this program does not affect U.S. citizens
[25].
Just like any technology, the range of international
interest in biometrics includes a complete lack thereof in
some countries, as well as daily life implementation in other
countries. Despite some resistance to the U.S.-established
timeframe for implementation of the Document 9303compliant passport in all VWP countries, the European
Commission endorsed the move to include biometric
technologies in its passports. On October 26, 2004, the EU
Justice and Home Affairs Council also voted to include
fingerprints as a second mandatory identifier in future
passports issued by EU members [26].
Debates over the use of biometrics in national
identification cards recently center stage in the United
Kingdom, with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Labour Party
pushing for a biometrically-enhanced national identification
card. The British government, looking to capitalize on the
research investments made by the ICAO and VWP countries
in passport technology, publicly announced its intent to
pursue national identification card legislation in late 2004.
According to the British Home Office, “The scheme will

C. Transmission Encryption
Another potential privacy concern exists during the
transmission of data between the chip and the reader. Just
like with any wired or wireless communication, there is
always the danger of an unauthorized user “snooping,” or
listening in, on the transmission. A number of different
techniques can be employed to encrypt data. Most depend
on either a public key, which is a password held by all those
authorized to access the data, or a private key, which is
created and used for that specific transaction. The ICAO
has developed an interface which employs a public/private
key encryption scheme, using the information printed on the
data page of the passport to produce a key, in particular from
the MRZ.
Encrypted transmission would commence
immediately following basic access control authentication.
The widely-recognized industry standard in electronic data
transmission is 128-bit Secure Socket Layer technology
[22].
D. Faraday Cage
The State Department has recognized that security of the
data stored on the chip is an essential piece of the research
and development challenge for the electronic passport. This
is especially important given the possibility that future
revisions of the passport may include additional, less
publicly available biometric information like iris or
fingerprint scans using the data structure using Document
9303’s data structure which could be harmfully used against
the rightful owner. In 2005, under continued pressure from
privacy groups and Congress, State opted to control access
through the use of a Faraday cage, implemented by
integrating thin metal fibers into the passport cover [21].
The basic principle of a Faraday cage is that by encasing an
object in metal, any electric or magnetic fields, such as the
ones used to communicate with and power an RFID chip,
can be prevented from passing through to the object. Such
protection would theoretically prevent reading of the
passport without the cover being physically opened.
Increases in the power of the reader field could theoretically
“break through” the cage, but it provides an additional layer
of security at minimal cost.
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C. Rollout Success
Progress toward deployment of ISO 14443 and ICAO
Document 9303-compliant passports varies greatly between
member EU member states. Had the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security not granted the extension to October
2006, only six European Union members – Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden –
had a chance of meeting the original 2005 deadline. Once
the final deadline was reached, only three countries—
Andorra, Brunei, and Liechtenstein—had not begun issuing
the electronic passport [28].

TABLE II
ACCURACY OF SELECTED BIOMETRICS
Accuracy
False Positive
Biometric
Percentage
Rate
Two-finger fingerprint
99.6%
1 out of 1000
(with all fingerprints
taken by experienced
officers)
90%
1 out of 100
Face Recognition
(with controlled
lighting)
54%
Unknown
Face Recognition
(with uncontrolled
lighting)

VI. RFID’S IMPACT

Analysis of the accuracy of biometrics used by some countries
in conjunction with the electronic passport, as conducted by
NIST in 2002 [24].

A. Electronic Passport
RFID has opened the door to new opportunities in identity
and travel documents, though much of its promise remains
out of reach in the interest of privacy and security. With the
electronic passport specification as a basis, future licenses
and identification cards can be built off of contactless IC
technology, taking advantage of its amorphous form factor,
ample storage space, and computational power.
The electronic passport itself opens the door to new ways
of issuing visas. The Document 9303 logical data structure
allows for optional storage of visa information on the RFID
chip itself [16]. Additionally, because the contactless design
does not require any particular orientation or line of sight,
future visas could be RFID tags themselves, attached to
blank pages in the passport. Effective MAC protocol design
would allow for the reading of both visas and passport data
in one swipe.

provide a simple and secure ‘gold standard’ for proving
identity, protecting people from identity fraud and theft and
providing them with a convenient means of verifying their
identity in everyday transactions.”
Public research
conducted between July 2002 and January 2003, showed
that 79 percent of British respondents favored the
introduction of identity cards with technology similar to that
of the ICAO-defined electronic passport [27].
B. Addressing Security Concerns
Despite the apparent effectiveness of the techniques for
maintaining document described in section IV, more subtle
concerns have continued to emerge regarding finer details of
the integrity of the electronic passport and similar RFIDbased identity documents. Techniques like basic access
control and the Faraday cage have made it very difficult to
track or access identity document data when implemented
and have allayed many fears regarding surveillance and
identity theft.
One widely-noted outstanding concern relates to the ISO
14443 standard’s collision avoidance / medium access
control features. Chips designed under the standard’s type
A specification broadcast a unique identifier which is then
received by the tag reader. The reader then uses these
identifiers to select tags to broadcast at particular times.
Type B devices instead use the slotted aloha MAC protocol,
which potentially requires more transmissions and delays
transaction completion [14].
The type A scheme could potentially result in a trackable,
open-access, unencrypted identifier if not chosen
dynamically, even on a chip which uses basic access control.
The type B scheme can pose a challenge in certain
application environments, however, as it requires more
advanced clock function than type A. Document 9303
allows either type A or type B contactless IC’s in electronic
passports [14].

B. Common Access Card
Future versions of the CAC may include RFID for access
control purposes, though the existing contact-based version
is considered the “gold standard” for internal government
identity documents [29]. A 2001 working group also
acknowledged the potential use of biometrics on the CAC as
a means of achieving “three-factor authentication” and
potentially counteracting any added security risk resulting
from the use of a contactless chip.
C. Driver’s Licenses
Initial indications are that RFID may not be the
technology of choice for the implementation of the Real ID
Act and its resulting standardization of state driver’s
licenses, as a draft DHS report issued in early 2006 warned
against the use of RFID for data storage in identity
documents or in any human tracking application. It also
noted that though the intended function of an RFID tag
could be data storage and easy access, this could morph over
time if left unchecked [30]. There is also some speculation
that Congress may choose to revisit Real ID as the deadline
20

for national standards draws near.
VII. CONCLUSION
The implementation of electronic passport has not been
without challenges, and some continue to challenge the use
of contactless technology in the passport and other identity
documents. Privacy groups voiced substantial concerns
about the means by which the data and picture are stored,
and questions regarding the effectiveness of the biometric
technology still remain. At the same time, other government
agencies have chosen different technologies for securing
their identity documents, and new opinions on the use of
RFID for identity purposes have been formed. Congress has
set arbitrary deadlines for implementations without
understanding the technological challenges involved.
We analyzed the major current and potential uses of RFID
in identity documents. We identified some of the areas of
promise for existing and future deployments, and we
considered the security concerns which accompany them.
Most important among these was the theme that future
implementers of RFID-based identity documents should take
note of the challenges involved in deploying the electronic
passport, and should appreciate the need for document
security at all steps in the development process.
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